This paper examines how product positioning and competition jointly impact prices and variable profits. Product positioning is analyzed both empirically and theoretically in the context of retail outlet locations in the fast food industry. First, I present an estimated model of demand and supply that accommodates the impact of geography on consumer preferences and competition. I then use this model to calculate how equilibrium prices and variable profits depend on an outlet's proximity to its competitors. The magnitudes of the effects are of direct interest to the fast food industry. However, the simulated theoretical outcomes have broader implications for horizontal product positioning in any product category.
INTRODUCTION
Marketing managers need to understand how product differentiation affects competition when deciding how to position a product. The importance of this topic has generated a vast literature on optimal product positioning in the presence of competitors.
Much of the theoretical literature on product positioning concludes that firms should differentiate their products in order to soften price competition. For example , Hauser (1988) finds this result using the defender model of Hauser and Shugan (1983) , while Moorthy (1988) gets similar results while examining the optimal positioning of verticallydifferentiated product lines. More recently, Tyagi (2000) shows that firms may choose to differentiate themselves from firms that have a cost-advantage over them. Neven and Thisse (1990) and Irmen and Thisse (1998) extend the literature by providing models where firms compete over several product attributes. Both papers conclude that firms will differentiate themselves through one product attribute -horizontal or vertical -and that all firms will choose the optimal product for the other attributes. However, not all models find that firms differentiate themselves; Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) show that otherwise identical firms competing for consumers with heterogeneous tastes along both a linear Hotelling dimension and a logit dimension will locate together at the center of the market when travel costs are low enough and that consumers are not too price sensitive. 1 These theoretical papers have been complemented by computational and empirical papers such as Gavish, Horsky and Srikanth (1983) and Sudharshan, May and Shocker (1987) , which study optimal product positioning in markets where consumers have ideal points in attribute space. However, these papers do not consider the price response to entry, which theoretical papers have shown to be important. Horsky and Nelson (1992) add competitive response by estimating a choice model and evaluating the optimal product positioning when competitors change their prices after entry. However, their model only accommodates consumers who do not have ideal attribute locations, which in their model means that it is only the cost of providing higher-quality products that prevents all firms from offering as much of all attributes as they can. Thus, their model cannot address issues such as which firms want to make their products similar to their competitors and which do not. Their paper also does not describe how prices and profits vary as the level of competition in the market is changed. This paper studies how prices and variable profits are affected by the degree of product differentiation present in a market with competitive price-response, as well as some implications of this relationship on optimal product positioning. One important way that this paper contrasts with other papers that have studied these issues is that the model used in this paper controls for consumer heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay in a more realistic manner and includes many of the complexities that exist in real industries: The model has vertical, global-horizontal and local-horizontal product dimensions, and is realistic enough to be estimated using real industry data. While the dimension of product positioning that I focus on is that of geography, the results are theoretical results, so they can guide managers looking to position any product on product dimensions over which consumers have ideal preference points.
I find that the relationship between product differentiation and price is often nonmonotonic; Increases in product differentiation can lead to lower prices. Furthermore, 3 equilibrium prices can be above monopoly levels. The subtleties in the shape of the relationship between prices and product differentiation suggest caveats towards what empirical specifications are appropriate for measuring the effect of product positioning: if a manager or a researcher does not properly control for the theoretical relationship between product differentiation and the intensity of competition then they are likely to under-measure the importance of the product positioning.
These findings also have implications about optimal product positioning. I find that the market leader generally wants to match the product positioning of market followers so few customers have a reason to buy the follower's product. Market followers, on the other hand, want to distinguish themselves from the market leader.
The approach used in this paper is computational-theoretic. While the model of consumer utility and firm costs is standard, it is too complex to solve for many of the results analytically. However, it is possible to solve for price-equilibria computationally given a set of parameters. In order to make sure the numerical simulations are realistic, I use Thomadsen's (2005) empirical estimates of the model's parameters from a dataset of Burger King and McDonald's franchisees.
2 By using estimates from a real industry, I
obtain not only theoretical results, but also insights into the fast food industry because the magnitudes of the effects are derived from data.
Thus, the approach I use is to first present a model of demand and supply, from which all of the theoretical results are derived. I then compute how equilibrium prices and variable profits derived from the fitted model vary as the fast food outlets are located closer or further from their competitors.
The simulations demonstrate that small amounts of differentiation (less than 2 miles) can have a significant impact on price (over 10%) and variable profits (over 50%), but that the exact layout of the firms has only a marginal impact. Further, prices and profits do not always vary monotonically with increased differentiation.
Prices level off at approximately monopolistic levels when the firm is located about 2 miles from their nearest competitor, while twice that level of differentiation is required in order for the outlets to earn monopolistic profits. This is due to the fact that the presence of a competitor has two effects on price. On one hand, the presence of a competitor increases the number of goods available to consumers, which decreases the willingness to pay at a particular outlet, leading to lower prices and lower variable profits.
On the other hand, the competitor generally steals consumers whose willingness-to-pay is lower than the average among the outlet's customers. Thus, the remaining consumers are those with higher willingness-to-pay. This latter effect is especially likely to be strong if the outlets are at an intermediate distance away, causing a negative correlation in consumers' willingness-to-pay for the goods across each of the outlets. In fact, it is possible for this second effect to be larger than the first effect, meaning that entry can increase prices. This matches the results found in Perloff, Suslow and Seguin (1996) ; However, the model used in this paper is consistent with industry data, while the model in The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the model of demand and competition that is used. Section 2 discusses the fast food industry, as well as brief synopsis of the data and parameter estimates. The heart of this paper is Section 3, which analyzes the role of geographic differentiation on competition by examining the results of the counterfactual experiments. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
THE MODEL
In this section, I present the model from which I derive the main results of this paper. While the model is fairly generic, I use the language of the fast food industry to describe it. The institutional details that justify the model's assumptions are contained in Section 2.
DEMAND
Demand for fast food meals at each of the outlets is modeled using a discrete-choice framework. Potential consumers (hereafter, consumers) can either purchase one meal from one of J fast food outlets or they can choose not to eat fast food. Geography is incorporated into the demand through travel costs that consumers incur when patronizing outlets far from either their residence or their work locations. This is comparable to the way that Bell and Lattin (1998) and Davis (nd) handle geography in their empirical studies. Consumers are spread across the county, and also differ in their demographics and in their unobserved tastes for each location-chain combination. Formally, consumer i''s utility from consuming fast food from outlet j is
where X j is a vector of dummies indicating (i) the chain to which outlet j belongs, (ii)
whether there is a drive-thru or a playland in the outlet, and (iii) whether the outlet is located in a mall. Also, D i,j denotes the distance between consumer i and outlet j, 4 and P j denotes the price of a meal at outlet j. Finally, β, δ, and γ are parameters to be estimated and η i,j is the unobserved portion of utility for individual i at outlet j.
One thing missing from equation (1A) that appears in many empirical papers is an outlet-specific residual term that is constant for all consumers. I do not include such a term because of the high level of homogeneity of the food and experiences within each of 3 I assume that consumers are perfectly informed about the prices, locations and nature of the food at all outlets in the market. Consumers can choose to eat at any of the outlets in the county; However, consumers will effectively choose only among the outlets close to them because of the high travel costs that would be incurred from traveling far across the country.
the outlets within each chain. Note, though, that the chain dummies capture not only the utility from observable product attributes of each chain's food, but also the utility obtained from intangible (and unobservable) attributes such as advertising, brand image, and any promotions (Burger King was running a Pokemon promotion at the time).
5,6
The consumer can also choose not to eat at any of the outlets -commonly called the "no purchase" option. In this case the consumer's utility will be:
where M is a vector of the consumer's demographic characteristics. In the estimated model these include age, gender, race and whether the consumer is at a work location. 7 I normalize β 0 = 0 because adding a constant to the utility derived from every potential option does not affect consumers' choices.
Consumers are located at one of B locations throughout the country. I denote the number of consumers of demographic M located at location b as h (b,M) . Each outlet's demand is then calculated by determining the fraction of consumers of a given location 5 The assumption that all unobservable attributes are captured by the chain dummies seems to be especially justified given that even large observable attributes such as a playland or drive-thru do not seem to have a measurable impact on price.
6 Empirically, these chain fixed-effects will be identified from the fact that the data contain multiple outlets in each chain. Therefore, even if unobservable attributes are correlated with prices, the fixed-effects resolve any potential price endogeneity and eliminate the need for instrumental variables procedures as discussed in Villas-Boas and Winer (1999), Chintagunta (2001), or BLP. and demographic who patronize each outlet as a function of the utility parameters, and then summing these choices across locations and demographics.
I assume that η i is distributed i.i.d. type I extreme-value. Then the fraction of consumers of demographic M at location b choosing to purchase a meal from outlet j is:
Total demand for each outlet is then the sum of its demand across all locations and demographics:
It is worth noting that there are three different sources of consumer heterogeneity in this model. First, consumers each have different preferences over each of the outlets due to the distribution on η.
8 Second, consumers have a different taste for fast food depending on their demographic characteristics, as modeled through their different preferences for the no-purchase option. Finally, the geographic locations of consumers and firms, along with consumers' distaste for travel, means that consumers generally only find those outlets close to them to be attractive.
The heterogeneity provided by the market geography means that the demand for fast food does not suffer the irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. 9 Rather, the geography of the market plays the same role in determining which products are closer/more distant substitutes as random coefficients play in many papers (McFadden and Train (2000) , Sudhir (2001) , Chintagunta, Dube and Singh (2003)), or that the variance-covariance terms play in papers using probit demand choice (Chintagunta (2001) ). In fact, the model of geographic competition presented above belongs to the class of mixed-logit demand functions. 
where FC j is the fixed cost of operating outlet j, c j is the marginal cost of a meal at outlet j, r k is the fraction of revenue that the franchisees belonging to chain k retain after paying their franchise royalties, 11 and P is the J-dimensional vector of prices for every outlet.
Note that maximizing (4) is the same as maximizing
as the marginal cost because the franchisees act as if they are maximizing profits with marginal costs of C j .
Different chains will have different marginal costs because they serve different food. However, it is also possible that the marginal costs differ across outlets belonging to the same chain. One can accommodate such differences by assuming that each outlet's marginal cost is equal to a chain-specific marginal cost plus a zero-mean unobservable
where C k represents the mean marginal cost for all outlets belonging to chain k, and ε j represents the zero-mean, outlet-specific, portion of marginal costs.
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I assume that the franchisees all know their true marginal cost, including ε j , when they set their prices. Then maximizing the profit function in equation (5) yields the following first-order conditions for the price at each outlet:
12 For Burger King and McDonald's, all outlets in the county belonging to the same chain will have access to food and materials at the same cost. However, heterogeneity in marginal costs may come from differences in the labor efficiency of workers and managers. Reiter (1991) , Schlosser (2001) and Emerson (1990) This implies that the first-order conditions can be rewritten as
where Q(P), C and ε are the vectors of quantities, chain-specific marginal costs, and outlet-specific marginal costs, respectively, at each of the outlets. operate largely as independent businesses within a framework of a national brandpurchasing their inputs from approved suppliers and setting their own prices.
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND AND ESTIMATION SYNOPSIS

THE FAST FOOD INDUSTRY
DATA AND ESTIMATION
In order to ensure that the effects of geographic competition presented in Section 3 are of a reasonable magnitude, I use parameters from Thomadsen (2005) , which estimated the model presented in Section 1 for competition among Burger King and
McDonald's outlets.
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I present here a brief summary of the data and estimation procedure; Readers interested in finer points about the estimation and the data are referred to the other paper.
The estimation uses an original dataset, collected over the summer of 1999, of the locations, menu prices, presence of drive-thrus and playlands, and ownership of all 64
McDonald's and 39 Burger Kings in Santa Clara County, California. The estimation 14 See Love (1995) , McLamore (1997) and Shook and Shook (1993 Lafontaine (1992) and Lafontaine and Slade (1997) note that a given franchisor tends to offer the same contract terms to each of the potential franchisees at a given point in time. 21 Some readers may worry that including both residential consumers and workers would cause doublecounting. However, this is not the case because of the no-purchase option. For example, the model allows that someone would only buy fast food while they are at work -then this person would choose the nopurchase option when they are at home.
demographic make-up of workers, I assume that all workers have the same value for the no-purchase option (except for the individual-level idiosyncratic match value).
The estimation approach of Thomadsen (2005) is similar to that of Bresnahan (1987) , Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (hereafter BLP), who estimate utilities and costs in differentiated industries from aggregate data. Similar to Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) , the model is estimated using only price data and not quantity data. Thomadsen (2005) discusses the conditions that are necessary for a model to be identified using only price data, but intuitively the model is identified because the demand side and the supply side of the model both provide relationships between observed prices and implied quantities that jointly identify the parameters of the model. Formally, the model is estimated without quantity data by substituting equation (3), which solved quantity as a function of the utility parameters, into equation (9):
. This is rearranged to solve for the vector of residuals for Generalized Method of Moments (hereafter GMM) estimation (Hansen (1982) ):
The moments are created by interacting the residuals from equation (11) miles NE of the outlet)], the population density of residents in the nearest census block-group, the worker "macro moments" (Imbens and Lancaster (1994) ), which match the ratios of average percapita consumption implied by the model across different age groups (under 18, 18-29, 30-64, 65 and above), across different genders, and across different races, to the national averages of these ratios as reported in Paeratakul et al (2003) .
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The estimates of the model are reported in Table 2 
MODEL SIMULATIONS
The estimated model does not directly demonstrate how market geography affects the way that firms compete. I therefore use the estimated model to run counterfactual simulations -computationally calculating the equilibrium for the estimated model -that demonstrate how outlet location affects prices and variable profits. All of the simulations are conducted by placing firms in a hypothetical 20-by-20 mile market with a uniform distribution of consumers.
26 I use such large market to avoid edge-of-market effects, but using more realistic market sizes yields similar results. I discretize the space by placing a grid of square, 1/10 x 1/10-mile cells over the market and treating all consumers located in a particular cell as if they were located at the center of the cell. I then aggregate over the decisions of consumers in each of the cells in the same manner as explained in Section 2.1. The marginal costs used in these experiments are the mean marginal costs for each chain's meal, as reported in Table 3 .
THE EFFECT OF DISTANCE ON COMPETITION
Figures 1 Since all variable profit calculations are only valid up to some factor of proportionality, I
report the variable profits as a percentage of the variable profits that would be earned by a monopolistic outlet belonging to the chain.
The graphs show that prices are lowest when the outlets are close to each other, but that prices increase as the firms are located further apart, approximately leveling off once the outlets are about 2 miles apart. In fact, a careful look at Figure 1 
reveals that
McDonald's prices are slightly above the monopoly price level when the outlets are between 2 to 4 miles apart. Other papers have found similar effects -where entry by a competitor can cause prices to increase -in the pharmaceutical, grocery store items and airlines industries (see Perloff et al (1996) , Ward et al (2002) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) 27 ).
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To see why prices can be above the monopoly level, note that a monopolist will set its price in a way that attracts both consumers who are far away and consumers who are close to the outlet. If the firm has a competitor located nearby then the outlet needs to cut its price in order to prevent the competitor from stealing away a large percentage of the customers. However, when a firm is at an intermediate distance apart -2 to 4 miles apart in this industry -then most consumers near an outlet will choose to patronize the 27 Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) find that prices increase for flights into Boston when Southwest Airlines enters into Manchester and Providence but not Boston.
28 Anderson, dePalma and Thisse (1992) discuss the mathematical properties that lead to this result (p.
187).
closer store unless there is a significant difference in price. Since each outlet will be able to attract consumers located close to them even at a higher price, but will have a difficult time attracting consumers far from them but close to their competitor, the firms shift their strategy of trying to attract all types of customers (those nearby and those far away), and instead focus on attracting the high willingness-to-pay consumers who are located nearby.
Put another way, entry has two effects on price. On one hand, entry by a competitor gives many consumers a more attractive alternative to the product than the no-purchase option provides, reducing the average willingness-to-pay of the consumers. On the other hand, if the outlets are far enough apart then the entrant systematically steals those consumers who have lower willingness-to-pay for the original outlet (since they were further away).
These two effects go in opposite directions, and while the first effect usually dominates, Figure 1 shows that the second effect can sometimes dominate. For practical purposes, however, these effects usually approximately offset once the outlets are far enough apart.
While the presence of a competitor 2-4 miles away can lead to prices that are above monopoly prices, the firm is still worse off than they would have been if they had been a monopolist: Variable profits are below the monopolistic levels because the outlet is unable to attract consumers that are located close to their competitor. As a result, variable profits are always below the monopoly level, and prices level off at smaller distances than variable profits do. These results are found across all of the experiments. While the price elasticities are small, the response of variable profits to a price change of a rival can be large for Burger King when the two firms are close together.
Burger King's variable profits increase about 1.6% for every 1% increase in an adjacent
McDonald's price, while McDonald's variable profits increase about 0.15 % for every 1% increase in an adjacent Burger King's price. These figures generally decline as the outlets are further apart. 30 The difference in these magnitudes can be attributed to the fact that when the outlets are close together most of the consumers choose to consume from
McDonald's, so any further increase in Burger King's price brings only a few new customers to McDonald's relative to McDonald's initial consumer base, but an increase in McDonald's price will bring many new consumers to Burger King, an effect which in percentage terms is even larger because Burger King has fewer initial consumers.
THE EFFECT OF INCREASED COMPETITION
The simulations in Figures The S-shaped response of price evident in Figure 4 means that a minimum amount of differentiation, ½ mile, is necessary before further differentiation has a significant impact on price. Also, the presence of competitors has a very small effect on price when the competing firms are 2 or more miles away -at these distances the McDonald's will charge slightly more than its monopoly price. In fact, the McDonald's prices increase slightly as there are more Burger Kings in the market when the competing outlets are 2 or more miles away. This is due to the same logic that led to the super-monopolistic pricing of the McDonald's outlet in Figure 
THE EFFECT OF MARKET LAYOUT
The results presented in Figures 6 and 7 variable profits. Also, consistent with the logic that was presented in the discussion of Figure 5 above, having both firms on the opposite side of the outlet causes small levels of differentiation to lead to a larger decline in variable profits than if both competitors were located on the same side. Finally, unlike in Figure 6 , the lines in Figure 7 never cross:
profits are always higher for the firm if their competitors are located together than if the competing outlets are more dispersed.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS ON OPTIMAL ENTRY
The results in the previous sections have implications on the product positioning strategies for firms. Figure 1 shows that McDonald's variable profits are higher when the outlet is located next to a Burger King than they are when the Burger King is located further away (but within the first mile of the outlet). In contrast, Figure 2 shows that Burger King's variable profits monotonically increase with increased geographic differentiation. Given that it is often not possible to get more than a mile of geographic The x-axis denotes how far the restaurant is from this mall.
McDonald's variable profits at the mall are about twice the monopolistic profit level from Finally, because geography is just one of many potential product attributes -one that is convenient to use due to the fact that it is relatively easy to observe -the theoretical results from this paper apply to product positioning in any industry with at least some horizontal differentiation. For example, the results of this paper suggest that Apple wants to make sure that iPods have at least the same set of features as their mp3 player competitors, while other mp3 players should try to differentiate themselves from iPod. Similarly, applied to the yogurt industry, this would imply that Dannon wants to make sure that other yogurts appealing to the same demographics do not offer flavors they do not offer, while the smaller yogurt companies have an incentive to find innovated new flavors -as long as they are attractive to a large enough demographic. 
